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In regard to such cases (see Bateman on Commercial Law, §§
711, 712), it has been thought that if the labor required by the
caontract can be performed without destroying all traces of the
identical thing, the transaction may be regarded in the light of a
bailment; but that if the labor cannot possibly be so performed, it
ought to be considered as a transfer of property by exchange, in
which the thing is given, together with a compensation for the
thing required.
No case, however, appears to have arisen in which the evidence
proved a bailment, and, at the same time, the non-existence of everj'
fact by which the identical thing delivered could be traced. And,
perhaps, it is well enough not to decide a case of which, as yet, no
evidence has been heard.
W. O. B.
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The writ of mandamus is not a writ of right, but it is discretionary with the Court
whether it will be awarded. When there is a complete remedy at law, it will
never be dispen'sed.
The isgue of the writ being discretionary, the court will not entertain jurisdiction
'where substantial interests are not involved; it would be to encourage petty
litigation. Where the sum involved, therefore, is only two dollars, the peremptory writ would be denied, even if it were admitted to be just to issue it.
A demurrer to the auditor's return to an alternative writ of mandamus, setting up
facts tending to show that the writ ought not to issue, some of which are provable by the legislative journals only, and some by parol evidence, admits not
only the facts resting on record evidence, but all facts necessarily existing outside of, and never appearing upon the journals, so far as they would be proper
evidence for any purpose.
Ifthe Constitution provide for the adjournment of the legislature by the governor,
in case of a disagreement between the two houses as to the time of adjournment.
and the governor, claiming that the contingency contemplated in the Constituo
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lion has arisen by proclamation, declares the houses adjourned, and the latter
acquiesce in that act, abandon the capitol, draw their pay, and return to their
homes, sucI acquiescence and dispersion constitute an adjournment of the legislature in fact, whether the act of the Governor was rightful or wrongful; and
the members cannot resume their session, unless legally convoked again by- the
Governor.
When the legislative and executive branches of the government, by the adoption
of an act, give a construction to a provision of the constitution, if the construction thus given is only doubtful, the courts will not hold the act-void.
The power of a legislature to enforce the attendance of absent members is plenary,
and may, if necessary, be enforced by posse civitatis.

THE facts of the case sufficiently appear in the opinion.
WALKER, J.-The record in this case shows that, on the 8th day
of June 1863, the Senate adopted a joint resolution for a final
adjournment at six o'clock in the afternoon of that day. It was
sent to the House, where it was taken up and amended by inserting the twenty-second of June, and ten o'clock in the forenoon,
as the time for adjournment; and thus amended, it was adopted by
the House. On the same day, as amended, it was returned to the
Senate, where it was taken up, and, on the question whether the
Senate would concur with the House amendment, it was decided
in the negative. During the afternoon of the same day, the House
adopted a resolution, in the preamble to Which they say they wish
to reconsider their action in amending the resolution. By the
resolution itself, they request the return of the joint resolution for
reconsideration. This resolution seems to have been communicated to the Senate immediately after the vote had been taken
refusing to concur in the House amendment to the joint resolution; but it does not appear that the Senate took any action upon
this request, nor that either house took any further steps on the
resolution to adjourn.
At four o'clock in the afternoon of the eighth, the Senate
adjourned until ten o'clock the next morning. The House, on the
evening of the same day, adjourned over until the tenth, in accordance with a previous resolution of that body. The Senate met on
the ninth and adjourned to the tenth, when it again met, and,
whilst in the transaction of business, the Speaker read a proclama-
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tion from the Governor, declaring the General Assembly adjourned
until the first Monday in January 1865 ; whereupon the speaker
vacated the chair, a Speaker pro ter. was elected, and a joint
committee was appointed, who reported a protest against the action
of the Governor, which was adopted and spread upon their journals,
and adjourned over until the morning of the eleventh, when there
is entered a convening order, after which all entries cease upon
the journals until the twenty-third of June.
The House met on the tenth, and, in the course of their proceedings, the Governor's proclamation was read to the House,
after which they joined in the appointment of a joint committee to
prepare the protist, which was also adopted by the House and
spread upon their journals; but the House journals fail to show
any adjourning order on the tenth, after which day all entries
cease until the twenty-third day of that month. It also appears
that, on the tenth, after the Speaker pro tem. was elected by the
Senate, the roll was called, and only twelve -Senators answered,
when a call of the Senate was ordered, but was afterwards dispensed with.
It appears, from the journals of both houses, that entries were
made on the twenty-third, stating that the houses had convened,
and afterwards that adjournments were had untilthe twenty-fourth.
Convening orders appear on both journals on that day, and a joint
resolution to adjourn both houses until the Tuesday after the first
Monday in January, 1864, after which no more minutes appear on
the journals of either house. The relator alleges that he was
present in the discharge of his duties as a Representative on these
two last days. That he holds the certificate of the Speaker therefor, which he presented to the Auditor for a warrant on the
treasury for the sum of two dollars alleged to be due, but that the
Auditor refused to draw the same.
The return alleges that, after the Governor's proclamation was
received on the tenth of June, the members of the two houses,
during that and the succeeding day, settled their accounts with
the Speakers; that they obtained from those officers their certificates of attendance, which were presented to the Auditor, who
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drew warrants on the treasury for their several sums; that they
obtained their pay, returned to their homes, and the doors of the
halls were closed; that on the twenty-third of June, two Senators
and four Representatives met in their respective halls, but denies
that they were in session as a legislative body at that time, and
that relator was not in attendance as a Representative, and is.
therefore, not entitled to compensation as such. It admits that.
the Speaker's certificate was presented, and a warrant on the
Treasurer was demanded and refused. To this return a demurrer
was filed, which presents the question as to the sufficiency of the
return of the Auditor.
The demurrer admits the truth of the facts set out in the pleadings to which it is interposed. But it is contended that it admits
such facts, only, as are well pleaded, and as could be used in evidence on the trial. That such facts as could only be proved by
record evidence, and which, from the pleadings, appear to exist
only in parol, would not be admitted. If this is the true rule,
which I deem unimportant to determine, still, all facts necessarily
existing outside of, and never appearing upon the journals, so far
as they would be proper evidence, would be admitted by the
demurrer. The settlement of the accounts, the drawing of their
pay by the members, their return to their homes, and the closing
of the halls, never appear upon the journals ;.and, if such facts
might be proved for any purpose, they would, under the rule contended for, be admitted by the demurrer. , The inferences or conclusions of law stated in the return would, of course, not be
admitted.
The Governor's proclamation was issued under
the thirteenth
section of the fourth article of our constitution. It is this: " In
case of disagreement between the two houses with respect to the
time of adjournment, the Governor shall have power to adjourn th(
General Assembly to such time as he thinks proper, provided it be
not to a period beyond the next constitutional meeting of the
same." The force of the argument, on both sides of this case,
seemed to be to the point whether the contingency contemplated
by this provision had arisen, so as to authorize the Governor to
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interpose his power to adjourn the General Assembly. From the
research and reflection that I have been able to give the case, I
have arrived at the conclusion that there are other questions
involved, material to its decision. And I shall, having stated the
facts, and what I deem proper under the demurrer to be considered, proceed to give my views as concisely as the nature of 'the
case will permit. I regret that an adjudged case cannot be found
involving the same or a similar state of facts, which could shed
light upon the question.
It is upon this state of facts the court is called upon to determine
whether the General Assembly -was adjourned on the tenth or,
twelfth day of June last. If, by the Governor's proclamation, by
the action of the two houses on those days, or if by the joint
action of the Governor and of the two houses, the' session was
either adjourned! or terminated, then there could have been no
session on the twenty-third and twenty-fourth of June, and the.
relator would not be entitled to compensation.
It is not denied that the Governor issued his proclamation under
the thirteenth section of the fourth article of our'constitution. In
doing so he claimed that the contingency therein provided for had"
arisen, and that he was authorized to act. And whether this be'
so or not,'when we see, from the absence of all entries upon the
journals, that the two houses ceased to hold further sessions, the
members drew their pay, returned to their homes, and the halls
were closed, this apparent acquiescence on the part of the members of the two bodies, to nmy mind is satisfactory evidence that
they designed to terminate the session. By.this course of action,
it would unquestionably seem that they had'determined to cease
to meet, and, whatever weight they may have attached to the
Governor's proclamation, they did, in fact, adjourn, or at least
ceased to hold their daily sessions, according to the usual course
of such bodies; and this cessation was, so far as the journals show,
without day. And it seems that it was designed to adopt the act
of the Governor. Suppose the Governor, -without any pretence of
a disagreement, had come into the house and declared them
%djourned8ine die, and the Speaker had so announced, and it had
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been entered on the journals of each house that on that day the
General Assembly had so adjourned, and the members had dispersed and business had ceased, would any person contend that the
session was not terminated, notwithstanding a want of a joint
resolution ?
Or suppose the Speaker, independent of all action by the
Governor, were to declare that the General Assembly was
adjourned sine die, and it should be so entered on the journals, and
the members should disperse, and further meetings should cease,
what would be the inevitable conclusion? While it is laid down
by all writers on parliamentary law that when such a body is once
organized, the session can be terminated only by the expiration of
she time for which the members were elected, by executive action,
or by resolution, they do not, so far as I can find, say that such a
resolution must appear on the journals. It is true that it is usually
by such a resolution that the dense of the two houses is obtained,
but, if that sense were manifested in Any other clear and satisfactory mode, no reason is perceived why it should not be as obligatory
as if it were reduced to writing and spread upon the journals. It
is the agreement of the two bodies that would form the resolution,
whilst the written resolve is only evidence of the joint concurrence
of the two bodies. If acts of the two houses appear, which render
it clear that it was their resolution to adjourn, I have no hesitation in saying that such would be the effect, although a joint
resolution did not appear upon the journals. If simultaneously
each house were to adopt a resolution, or simply vote, that they
would adjourn at the same time, and when the period had arrived,
they were to act upon it, I am unable to perceive that the session
would not be terminated.
It is true that the joint rules of the two houses provide for an
adjournment sine die by joint resolution. But this is not a constitutional requirement, and, like all such rules, it was adopted to
facilitate the transaction of business, and doubtless should be observed by the two houses; but will it be said that, because this or
any other rule is violated, an act not in contravention of the constitution is void alone for that reason ? Suppose a law should be
VOL. XII.-22
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adopted with all the constitutional and legislative requireluents,
but in violation of a joint rule, or a rule of one of the houses, can
it be said that the law would be void ? Our constitution has prescribed no mode by which the sessions of the General Assembly
shall terminate. That is left to the two houses to determine; the
only check it has imposed being a prohibition upon either house
from adjourning for more than two days without the consent of the
other. I am, therefore, of the opinion that a joint resolution,
formally adopted and spread upon the journals, is not indispensable to the termination of the session by an adjournment without

day.
Suppose the two houses were, in fact, to adopt such a resolution, and disperse on the day fixed, and suppose the Clerks of the
two houses, by accident or design, were to fail to enter it upon the
journals, would the General Assembly be adjourned? Or have
the clerks the power to thwart the purpose of the housts by continning the session against the unanimous consent, it raay be, of
the members? If such is the effect of their neglect, it would also
give them the power to prevent laws regularly adopted, and
intended to take effect sixty days after the day agreed upon for'
an adjournment sine die, from going into operation; also, -to prevent the Executive from returning bills to the house in which they
originated, with his objections, within the period libaited by the
constitution; and thus deprive the Governor of his right to the
employment of his limited veto powers in the mode prescribed by
the constitution. If an adjournment without day cannot be effected
eicept by a resolution for that ptlrpose appearing upon the
journals; if nothing can be inferred from the absence of all entries
for a long space of time; or if parol evidence cannot be received
to prove the occurrence of acts and circumstances outside of the
journals, and which are never found upon them, from which inferences may be indulged, then the negligence of the clerks might
produce all of these consequences.
As a matter of history in legislation, it seems to be true that,
when the hour arrives for adjournment, the members are usually
not in the halls, and do not remain to see that the journals are
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made up, leaving that to be done by the Clerks. It may be said
that such an omission could be corrected by the houses when they
again convene; but, if the members never return, it would not be
corrected, nor could it generally be done in time to enable the
Governor to return bills placed in his hands within ten days before
the adjournment. Nor is it probable that it could be proved by
verbal evidence that the resolution had been adopted, any more
than that a bill had passed which did not appear from the journals,
or that a court had rendered a judgment which the Clerk had
failed to record.
Again, it is a rule familiar to the profession, that when the
legislative and executive branches of the government, by the
adoption of an act, give a construction to a provision of the constitution, if the construction thus given is only doubtful, the courts
will not hold the act void. It is only in cases of its clear infringement that courts will interpose to hold the act nugatory. And it
is for the reason that each co-ordinate branch of the government
is under an equally solemn duty to support and maintain that
instrument, and, when they have performed the act, it must be
presumed that they have not acted with a reckless disregard of so
high a duty. Then, applying this rule, when the Governor asserted
his right to adjourn the session, if the two houses acquiesced in it,
the court would not say that it did not produce an adjournment,
unless it was clear that such was not the effect. It is true that the
session might terminate and yet the Governor have no constitutional power under the circumstances to adjourn the body. But
the course of the two houses acting upon the Governor's suggestions, in dispersing and not coming again together, would show that
both of these branches of the government understood the session
to have terminated.
But suppose the case is considered on the subsequent acts of the
two houses and the members. It was the manifest design of the
framers of the fundamental law of the State to confer ample power
upon the two houses of the General Assembly to continue their
sessions to the full extent of the necessity of its continuance. To
effectuate this object, they adopted the twelfth section of the third
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article of the constitution, "whiCh is this: -Two-thirds of each
house shall constitute a quorum ; but a smaller number may
adjourn from day to day, and compel the attendance of absent
members." The framers of that instrument, no doubt, supposed
that they had conferred ample power, by this clause, to prevent
the termination of their sessions by the reason of a want of a quorum, because they grant power to compel the attendance of absent
members. If the members of the two houses who remained after
the proclamation was announced believed it was unwarranted, why
was not this power invoked for the purpose of restoring a quorum ?
it was suggested, on the afgument, that such an effort would
have proved unavailing; but the court cannot assume this fact to
be true. Each house being clothed with that power, and. failing
inits'exercise, it would seem to indicate that they did not, on their
final action, suppose their privileges were invaded. It would seem
to be natural that, if they believed the act of the Governor to be
unconstitutional, they, to preserve the dignity of the house,-to
pre'vent the encroachment of executive power upon their rights,would have done some act to preserve the session, if .not by the
enforcement of the attendance of members, at least by adjourning from day to day, as authorized by the constitution.
Why was the power' given to a,less number than a quorum to
adjourn from day to day, if not to enable a minority to'continue
the life- of the session? According to legislative usage, any
number less than a quorum have no power to perform any legislative function. The framers of that instrument must have supposed
th at, unless such Power was conferred, an adjournment from day
to'day could not be had by less than a quorum, and that, in such
case, the session must end. Otherwise, why insert the provision?
It must be supposed that those who adopted that instrument.em.
ployed no language beyond what was necessary to express their
ideas in the clearest and most unambiguous manner. Nor can it
be supposed that they would delegate by express provision power
already possessed. Every delegation of 'power to the offcers of
government, or the Legislature, was made to accomplish a purpose.
And in this I am at a loss to perceive any other than to enable the
body to prevent a termination of their sessions.
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Again, by article 3,section 13, of the constitution, it is declared
that "Each house shall keep a journal of their proceedings, and
publish the *same." This requirement being peremptory, it must
be presumed that the two houses will, when in session, observe and
perform the duty. We have no right to suppose, or by any means
conclude, that they will disregard the injunction. Then can it be
inferred, when we find the journals blank for at least ten legislative days, that the two houses were in session, and, in violation of
their obligation to the constitution, were keeping no journals of
their proceedings? Is it not more reasonable to presume that the
houses were not in session? It may be said that they did no
business, but we would expect to find convening and adjourning
orders, at the very least, if they were in session. The almost
uniform custom of such bodies is to note every day that portion of
their proceedings, if no other transaction. Then, if they were not
in session, were they not adjourned? And, if so, the minutes of
the two journals having closed without any adjournment to any
day, was it not an adjournment without day?
Whilst .an adjournment from day to day is designed to, and
does, keep the session in life, an adjournment sine die is always
understood to terminate the session. And, to prevent either
house from delaying or preventing the transaction of business and
terminating the session before the two houses are ready to end it,
the nineteenth section of the same article declares that "Neither
house shall, without the consent of the other, adjourn for more
than two days, nor to any other place than that in which the two
houses shall be sitting." Under this provision, it will be seen
that each house was powerless, without the consent of the other,
to adjourn beyond two days. And the journals offered no evidence that consent was given by either for a temporary adjournment. Yet we do find, from the fact that there is a blank in the
journals, indications of an entire suspension of business, from
which we must conclude that the two houses were not in session ;
'and, if not in o'ession, the presumption must be that they were
adjourned either to a particular day, or without day. And, as wo
find no order of adjournment on the journals to a day, it would
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seem to follow that it was sine die. Each house had the right,
without the consent of the other, to adjourn from day to day; and.
if they had so adjourned, it would be expected to appear from the
journals.
It is but a reasonable presumption, when we find the two houses
adjourned, or at least out of session, for more than two days, that
it is by consent, rather than in violation of the constitution. And,
when the journals show no adjournment to a specified time, it must
be presumed to be sine die. It is, however, said that, When the
body rises without coming to a resolution to adjourn to a specified
day, it must be presumed tha't it was intended to be till the next
legislative day. When the rising is followed by the body coming
together on that day, the inference would be natural and proper.
But, when they fail to meet on that day, the presumption is
rebutted. And, in this case, the journals fail to show that they did
meet on the next or succeeding day.
If the presumption is indulged that this was not designed to be
a final adjournment by consent of the two houses, then the session
continued, and the body might come together at any time they
chose before the organization of the next house, and resume
business. If this were so, who could know when laws* took
effect ? Could it be possible that the members and officers of the
two houses could draw pay during all that time ? The fact that
the people and the officers of the law must know when laws take
effect, renders it absolutely necessary that there should be a time.
that might be certainly known, when laws become operative; and
that can only be from the journals. If we find that the session
terminated in pursuance of a resolution, that is satisfactory and
conclusive; or, if we find that all business has ceased for a period
of more than two days, without an adjourning order, and* no
entries are found, then the inference should be drawn that it Was
an adjournment sine die, and equally terminated the session.
In this case, the last entry is found on the Senate journal of the
eleventh day of June, and it must be presumed that the session
terminated on that day. If so, it cannot matter whether there
were many or few members of the two houses who came together
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on the twenty-third, as they had no power to revive the session
already terminated, which could only be brought together by
Executive proclamation.
The writ of mandamu8 is not a writ of right, but it is discretionary with the court whether it will be awarded. When there is
a complete remedy at law, it will never be dispensed. To this
effect is the uniform current of authority.
Being discretionary, and the sum in this case being only two
dollars, even if it were admitted to be just, I do not feel that
justice would be promoted by entertaining jurisdiction, as substantial interests are not involved. It would be to encourage
petty litigation, to the expense of the State, and the delay of other
important interests.
For this, if for no other reason, I should be inclined to refuse
the writ; but I regard either of the various grounds discussed as
amply justifying the court in arriving at that conclusion. When
the alternative writ was granted, all questions as to its sufficiency
were reserved, and I am now satisfied that it was improvidently
issued, and that there are no grounds shown for relief.
The peremptory writ is therefore refused.
NOTE 1.
I. The above case is interesting to all
classes, from the political occurrences in
which it originated, and important to
the profession by reason of the legal
principles discussed and applied. By
special arrangements we are enabled to
lay it before the readers of the REGIsTER
some months in advance of its publication in the reports. It is part of the
currenthistory of thecountry, that, in the
session of the General Assembly of Illinois, to which the foregoing opinion
relates, sundry political discussions
assumed a very angry and even threatening aspect. So much so, that it was
at one time annouthced in the public
press that civil war in that state was
imminent, if, indeed, it had not already
commenced. Differing, as the Governor

did, in sentiment with a majority of the
legislature, his order of adjournment
was viewed by many as totally unauthorized, and as being simply a skilful political coup d'etat. It is understood that
the general political views of the judges
are not, in all respects at least, in exact
coincidence with those of the executive.
It does the court great credit that in the
foregoing opinion its members have had
the good sense and the good taste exclusively to confine themselves to the
case in its legal aspects and relations.
The elementary principles applicable
to the writ of mandamus, are clearly and
correctly stated. The chief interest of
the case, in this respect, consists in the
application of these principles to an unusual state of facts. The point as to the
non-conclusive effect of the certificate of
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the Speaker upon the auditor is, so far
as we recollect, new, and, in our judgment, was rightly ruled.
II. But the interest and importance
of the case centre mainly upon the Governor's order of adjournment, and the
subsequent action of the legislative body.
We have heard the criticism made that
the court did not, in the principal case,
fairly and fully meet and determine the
issues which it involved. We cannot
acquiesce in the justice of this stricture.
It is true that the case might possibly
have been decided on other grounds, one
of which -we will presently suggest. It
is also true that it presented other points,
which might legitimately have been decided, but which, under the view taken
by,-the court, it was unnecessary to decide. The record advised the court that
the General Assembly did, in fact, close
their session in consequence of the executive order; that the members acquiesced in this order, ceased their labors, drew their pay, and dispersed.
And the court very properly conclude
that the session was ended-adjourned
-and this whether the order was or
was not authorized, and hence it was not
essential to pass upon its validity.
But the opinion is silent upon a most
material view of this order, and one
which it seems to us must have occurred
both to the counsel and the court; and
that is the question, whether the decision of the Governor, that there was "a
disagreement between the two houses
with respect to the time of adjournment"
(Art. 4 sec. 13 of Const ) can be reviewed
by the judicial department of the government ? It cannot be said that the executive acted wholly without pretence of
right, for that there was some "disagreement with respect to the time of adjournment" is evident. That this disagreement had become fixed and irreconcileable does not so clearly appear.

Under these circumstances we have
grave doubts whether the judgment of
the executive, that such a disagreement
existed as authorized him to adjourn the
body, can, of right, or ought, from
courtesy to a co-ordinate branch of the
government, to be reviewed and set aside
by the courts. There are cases, not in
point we admit, but which by analogy,
and by the principles upon which they
rest, strongly favor the idea of the conclusiveness of the executive decision
upon all persons. Thus,. where an Act
of Congress authorized the President to
call forth the militia of the states
"whenever the United States should be
invaded, or be in imminent danger of
invasion," it was held by the Supreme
Court of the United states that the
President was the exclusive and fnal
judge whether the exigency contemplated had arisen: Martin vs. Mott, 12
Wheat. 19. Mr. Justice STOnro, who
delivered the opinion,- thus expounds
the principle onwhich itrests:-" Whenever a statute gives a discretionary
power to any person to be exercised by
him upon his own opinion of certain
facts, it is a sound rule of construction
that the statute constitutes him the sole
and exclusive judge of the existence of
those facts. It is no answer that such
power may be abused, for there is no
power which is not susceptible of abuse.
The remedy for official misconduct is to
be found in the constitution itself:"
12 Wheat. pp. 81, 82; see also AttorneyGeneral vs. Brown, 1 Wis. 513. Again:
-Where a legislature reserves power to
repeal a charter for a violation of its
provisions, it is held that they may determine whether the contingency has
happened, and that such determination
cannot be judicially reviewed. Creaser
,
vs. Babcock, 23 Pick. 384 Miner's
Bank vs. U. States, I G. Greene (Iowa)
553. In the case first cited, MonrTo, J
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remarks :-" If a default has been committed, then, by the express terms of the
compact, they -(the legislature) have the
right to exercise the power. They have
exercised it, and therefore, by the
courtesy and confidence which is due
from one department of the government
to another, we are bound to presume
that the contingency upon which the
right to exercise it depended has happened."
On the other hand, and in a large
class of cases, the judicial tribunals are
constantly in- the habit of examining
into the legality of the acts of the other
branches of the government. In 1840
Chancellor WALWORTH, in Warner vs.
Beers, 23 Wend. 125, threw out the
doubt, but did not decide the point,
whether "a court is authorized in any
way to institute an inquiry into the
mode in which a law, signed by the
Governor, and duly certified by the
Secretary of State, was passed," though
the contrary opinion had been before
intimated in Thomas vs. Dakin, 22
Wend. 9, 112. See also Eld vs. Gorham,
20 Conn. 8. But during the next year
it was for the first time decided in New
York-the question being admitted by
BRoNsoN, J., to be one of great difficulty
-that while the requisite constitutional
solemnities in the passage of an act,
published in the statute book, would be
presumed, yet the contrary may be
shown by proper proof, as by the journals ; The People vs. Purdy, 2 Hill 31 ;
s. o. and s. P. 4 Id. 384; De Bon vs. The
People, 1 Denio 9; and there are many
subsequent cases in the same state to the
same effect. A similar decision had
before been made by the Supreme Court
of another state; The State vs. McBride,
4 Mo. 303; and many similar decisions
have since been made in other states;
Spangler vs. Jacoby, 14 Ill. 297; Turley vs County of Logan, 17 Id. 151 ;

McCulloch vs. The State, 11 Ind. 424;
The State vs. Moffat, 5 Ohio 358 ; Green
vs. Graves, 1 Doug. (Mich.) 351; Ferguson vs. Miners' &c. Bank, 3 Sneed
(Tenn.) 609. As to majority and twothirds' votes on passage of laws, see
Southwark vs. Palmyra R. R. Co., 2
Mich. (Gibbs) 287; 4 Mo. 302; 32 Miss.
(3 George) 650. The foregoing cases
establish the principle that the courts
will go behind the published statutes
and inquire into their legislative history,
and will pronounce any act void which
has not been passed with the proper
constitutional solemnities, as, for example, by the requisite number of votes.
So an act is void which was shown to
have been approved by the Governor,
after the legislature bad terminated.
Fowler vs. Pierce, 2 Cal. 165. The kind
of evidence which is admissible in making such an inquiry, will now be briefly
alluded to.
III. It will be seen by the principal
case that the court incline to the opinion
that the journals which the law requires
each house to keep, are the only proper
evidence of legislative. proceedings, or
at least that parol evidence is not receivable. This view is well sustained.
We refer to some of the cases bearing
upon this subject. While neither the
proclamation ormessage of the Governor,
or reports of committees, nor even the
journals, are evidence of the meaning of
a law (Bank of Penna. vs. The Commonwealth, 7 Harris 156), yet the journals
are the highest evidence of the time.
manner, and circumstances of the passage of bills, and may be used to identify
bills; to fix the time of passage; to
show that a bill was signed by mistake; or that it was never enacted, or
that it did not receive the requisite-con
stitutional majority: The Southwark
Bank vs. The Commonwealth, 26 Penna.
St. 446; Warner vs. Beers, 23 Wend
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137, 171; Purdy vs. The People, 2 Hill the legislature : Turley vs. County of
Logan, 17 Ill. 151; The State vs. Moffit,
31, 4 Id. 884; and cases cited infra.
In Spangler vs. Jacoby, 14 Ill. 297, 5 Ohio, 858.
But. in one case before cited (Fowler
the court went so far as to hold that,
where, on the final passage of a bill, the vs. Pierce, 2 Cal. 165), the court sancennstitution requires the ayes and noes tioned the reception of parol evidence to
to be entered on the journals, if the show that an act which was passed on
journal fails to show that these require- the last day of the session was, in fact,
ments were complied with, the act falls, approved not on that day but on the next
and the journal is conclusive evidence. day, and was therefore void. Further,
Other courts have presumed in favor of as to the journals as evidence : Watkins
the legislative proceedings, when the vs. Holman, 16 Pet. 25, 56 and cases;
journals, as to certain requisite steps Starkie's Ev. 199; 26 Pa. St. 451 upra;
in the passage of bills, were silent; and Miles vs. Stevens, 3 Pa. St. (Barr) 21;
this seems to us to be correct: McCul- Waner vs. Beers, 23 Wend. 125.
As to the admissibility of parol eviloch vs. The State, 11 Ind. 424; Miller
vs. The State, 3 Ohio (N. S.) 475. But dence of the doings of town and city
the same cases hold the journals to be councils, which are local or miniature
conclusive of all facts which they affirma- legislatures, see Ross vs. City of Madison,
tively show, that evidence to show fraud 1 Carter (Ind.) 281; Poweshick County
or mistake in them cannot be received, vs. Ross, 9 Iowa 511 ; Meeker vs. Van
and that they can only be corrected at Rensselaer, 15 Wend. 897.
S
J. F. D.
the same or some subsequent session of

NOTE IT.
More than half our constitutions contain a provision for an adjournment of
the legislature by the Governor, in cases
of -9 disagreement" between the two
houses, in terms similar to those recited
in the principal case. It is believed
that, until the present, no case has arisen
in which the executive has had occasion
to'exercise this prerogative.
That the court has not decided the
precise point, therefore, as to the degree
of difference between the two houses,
which shall constitute a disagreement
within the meaning of the constitution,
has occasioned some disappointment in
the profession, though, under the circumstances, the wisdom and propriety
of allowing the case to go off on minor
points, is not doubted. The public
peace is of more consequence than the
settling of an interesting precedent.

For the benefit of the profession, however, we propose to state the principal
arguments bearing on the question of
disagreement, as fully as the limits ea
note will permit.
Was the Governor of Illinois warranted in issuing his proclamation of adjournment, under the facts recited in
the opinion?
I. In the affirmative it may be argued,
1. That the reason assigned by
writers on constitutional law for giving
the prerogative in question to the executive, is, "that there might be a peaceable termination of what would otherwise be an endless and dangerous con1563.
troversy :" Story on Const.,
Ought the rule to be established, that a
controversy must run its course until it
has become dangerous, if not well nigh
endless; or in other words, until both
parties have exhausted all methods of
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coercion known to legislative bodies,
before the peace-compelling intervention
of the Governor can be tolerated?
2. The houses constituting the General Assembly are theoretically independent: Cush. Law and Pr. Leg. Ass.,
p. 875. Although no joint resolution
can take effect, as such, and no bill can
become a law without having passed
both houses, still there is no constitutional mode in which either can coerce
the other into passing them.
The employment of devices to produce
unanimity is discretionary, and even if
there be joint rules which seem to render the use of such devices necessary
to the regular progress of legislative
business, those rules can be disregarded
by either house at its pleasure, without
impairing the validity of its acts: Cush.
Law and Pr. Leg. Ass., J 857, 858, 2292.
8. Theword "disagreement" isused in
the constitution in a non-technical sense.
It means merely a difference of opinion
between the two houses, expressed by a
Tote or resolution as to the time of their
adjournment, without reference to the
probable obstinacy of either in adhering
When the Senate,
to that opinion.
therefore, by joint resolution, fixed upon
the 8th of June to adjourn, and the
House, by an amendment, fixed upon
the 22d of June, in which amendment
the Senate refused to concur, it is idle
to contend that there was no disagreement between them. A resort to the
device of committees of conference could
end only in either confirming or resolving a disagreement already complete.
4. But supposing that the disagreement must be irreconcilable, the fact
that it is so *may be inferred from other
circumstances, as well as from the unsuccessful conferences of committees.
The temper of the houses may be known
to be unaccommodating, or they may
severally so far represent the views of

opposing parties, whose interests may
be thought to be involved in the question, that it would be clear they could
never agree.
5. By the rules of parliamentary law,
the Senate could not ask for a committee
of conference until a disagreement had
actually taken place. The object of &conference is to reconcile a disagreement, and not to ascertain whether there
is to be one: Jefferson's Manual, p. 121;
Cush. 328, note.
6. As a matter of legislative history,
committees of conference on a question
of adjournment are unheard of. They
were, therefore, not contemplated by the
framers of the constitution.
7. No communication from the two
houses to the Governor was necessary
to apprise him of the fact of disagreement between them. The journals of
the two houses, published from day to
day, and made evidence by the laws of
the state, were open to his inspection,
as to that of all citizens. It was sufficient, if he knew the fact: Cush. 291,
J 786.
8. No sufficient argument ab inconvenienti can be framed against the exercise
of the power of adjournment, as in this
case, in the United States, where the
sessions of the legislature recur so frequently. The constitution brings to
gether again, in a few months, the legislators dispersed by the Governor, fresh
from the people, cooler, and perhaps
better instructed.
9. The power of adjourning the General Assembly, given by our constitutions
to the Governor, is not a legislativo
power, and its exercise by him, even if
not specially provided for in the fundamental laws, would not contravene the
constitutional provision which prohibits
anyperson constituting one of the three
departments into which the government
is divided, from exercising any power
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properly belonging to the others, though
doubtless it would be a high-handed,
perhaps an unconstitutional, act. A
power to adjourn a legislature is, in this
country, a power merely to suspend the
ezercise by it of legislative functions for a
limited time.
10. A mere non-agreement, if not always equivalent to a disagreement, may,
under special circumstances, become so.
Suppose, in a treaty of purchase, the
seller should ask one price and the buyer
offer another; at this stage there would
be a non-agreement merely; but if
either party thereupon should drop the
treaty and permanently take his leave,
the non-agreement would become a disagreement. So, here, the court is asked
to determine whether, on .the 10th of
June 1863, when the Governor's proclamation was read, there was a disagreement between the houses. In the
light of existing and subsequent facts,
the discordant votes, the absence of a
quorum, the final dispersion of all the
members, &c., &c., the court must affirm
that there was. Had the houses not
themselves so viewed it, they would
have remained at their posts, and have
disregarded the proclamation.
II. On the other hand, it may be
urged,
1. That the clause in question was inserted in our constitutions to obviate the
embarrassments which might arise in
case one house should attempt to retain
the other in session against its will, or
the two houses should, in good faith,
arrive at an irreconcilable difference
of judgment as to the time of adjournment, or, under the control of factious
or ambitious men, should attempt to
make the sessions of the assembly perpetual: Madison, in 3 Ell. Deb. 867,
409; Story on Const., 843, 1563.
2. The word "disagreement" is applied in this connection to the proceed-
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ings of a legislative body, and can meau
nothing else than a parliamentary disagreement.
a. By persons outside of it, a legislative body can be said to 'have acted on
a resolution or bill only when its action
has been consummated; that is, when,
by some conclusive vote, it has cither
passed it or refused to pass it; and a
resolution of adjournment is not different, in this respect, from any other: a
disagreement in relation to it can be
said to exist only whin final antagonistic action is reached, or all efforts
towards agreement are abandoned. At
this point, executive intervention is not
in hostility to the General Assembly, hut
is the access of an impartial umpire.
b. The regular parliamentary progression to a disagreement consists of
five steps : first, the originating house
non-concur ; second, the amending
house insists; third, the originating
house insts; fourth, the amending
house adheres ; fifth, the originating
house adheres. Conferences, of which,
in this country, at least two,, and in
England twice that number, are had
during the progression, are parts or accompaniments of these five steps. The
insisting term may be omitted, but there
can be no final action without adherence: 4 Hatsell 1-49, 380; Jeff. Man.,
339; Cush. L. & Pr. Leg. Ass. 22312275.
c. In the principal case, but one of
the steps, non-concurrence, had been
taken.
3. It is a mistake to suppose that a
conference could not precede a disagreement. The rule, as laid down by parliamentary authorities, is the reverse of
that: 3 Hatsell 226, 269, 341 , 10 Grey
137; cited and confirmed in Jefferson's
Manual.
4. No "disagreement" of any kind
existed on the 10th of June, the day the
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Governor caused his proclamation of
adjournment to be read. There could
be no disagreement existing on the 10th,
as to whether there should be any adjournment on the 8th, twb days before.
5. To the objection, that disagreement
is a matter of intention, and if either
house intends to bring about that state
of affairs, it can do so, without regard to
parliamentary laws or legislative rules,
it is sufficient to say, that such an intention must affirmatively appear, which
is so far from being the case here, that
the contrary is solemnly asserted on the
record by a majority of each house.
6. The Governor was not officially informed of the disagreement, if any existed, and it is a breach of privilege for
the executive to take notice of any proceeding in either branch of the legislature until his attention is called to it by
that body itself: Jeff. Man.
II.; 2
Hatsell 332, et seq, and 425; Cush L.
and Pr. Leg. Ass. J 737; Com. Dig.
Parliament, G. 7. This seems to have
been the view of the framers of the
Rhode Island constitution, which provides for an adjournment by the Governor in case of a disagreement, "certified
to him by either" house.
7. An adjournment is an exercise of
legislative power ; 2 Hatsell 294 et seq.;
1 Black. Com. 186; Jeff. Manual 44.
As such, it can be exercised by the Governor only in cases expressly provided
for; Const. Ill., Art. I. 2; and the
clause giving him the power must be
strictly construed.
8. If committees of conference on
questions of adjournment are unheard

of, it may be for the reason simply that
it is not usual for the houses to disagree
on those questions, so far as to make the
use of them necessary. It is only in
times of extreme excitement, not often
witnessed in this country, that such a
difference is to he looked for.
9. Under the colonial governments,
the undue exercise of the power of adjourning the legislative assemblies by
the royal governors, constituted a great
public grievance, and was one of the
numerous cases of misrule upon which
the Declaration of Independence relied;
1 Story on Const. J 844. The people of
the United States, entertaining thus a
strong jealousy on the subject, attempted
in their constitutions to interpose a barrier against the use, or the abuse, of such
a prerogative by the executive. Some of
the states, as Delaware and Virginia, in
their first constitutions, expressly prohibited its exercise, while the-others restricted it in substantially the same
terms as in the Illinois constitution. Of
the constitutions n6w in force, fifteen
contain no clause permitting the use of
such a prerogative by the Governor in
any case; and in those states, under the
general principles of law, the houses
'alone have the power of adjournment.
The remaining constitutions contain a
provision similar to that of Illinois.
The ruling idea, therefore, in the United
States is the entire prohibition or the restriction to cases of necessity, such as a
dead-lock of the houses, of the exercise
of a power necessarily distasteful to a
free people.
T. A. J.
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Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
PAINTER VS. THE CITY OF PITTSBURGH.
Where a person employs another, exercising a distinct employment, to do work by
a special contract, for a stipulated sum, and does not interfere with the mode
of performance, he is not responsible for the acts or negligence of the contractor or his employees.
This rule applies with full force to municipal corporations.
The case of Bush vs. tcinman, 1 Bos. & Pull. 404, rejected as authority.

This was an action by the widow of George Painter against the
May'or, Aldermen and Citizens of Pittsburgh, to recover damages
for causing the death of George Painter, by negligently leaving. a
sewer on Duquesne Way, in said city, open and unprotected by
proper barricades. The defendants as matter of defence, alleged
that the city was not constructing said sewer, through the regular
officers of the city, but under a contract with Allen, and that the
city were the mere agents of the property-holders, who by virtue
of an Act of Assembly, would have to pay for said sewer, under
assessment, and being such agents, and having the work done by
contract, were not liable in law for any injuries resulting from
negligence of the contractors, their workmen and employees;
George Painter, the husband of plaintiff, on the night of the
28th June 1859, while passing along Duquesne Way, fell into the
sewer, some 20 feet deep, and received injuries which caused his
death.
On the trial of this action the jury found a verdict for plaintiff
fot $2100, but points having been reserved by the judge and
afterwards argued, the court finally entered judgment on the
reserved points, for the defendants, non obstante veredioto, and
thereupon the plaintiff took this writ of error.
Hamilton & Acheson, and Thomas B. Hamilton, for plaintiff in
error.-The only way in which a municipal corporation can perform its functions in respect to its streets and other highways,
is through the intervention of agents.
"A corporation is liable for the wrongful acts and neglects of
its servants and agents, done in the course and within the scope of

PAINTER vs. CITY OF PITTSBURGH.

their regular employment; upon the same ground; in the same
manner; and to the same extent that natural persons are."
Angell & Ames, sec. 210, and the authorities therein referred to.
The principal is liable in a civil suit, to third persons, for the
frauds, deceits, concealments, misrepresentations, torts, negligence.
and other misfeasances and omissions of duty by his agents, in
the course of their employment, although the principal did not
authorize or justify, or participate in, or indeed know of such
misconduct, or even if he forbade them, or disapproved of them.
Story on Agency, see. 452; Paley on Agency 294, 305; 2 Kent's
Com. 633; Smith on Master and Servant 152, Law Library.

vol. 75.
The contract with Allen & Kerr for the construction of the
sewer, did not release the city from keeping the street in such
order as not to endanger others; or prevent the city authorities
from putting proper guards and hindrances around the excavation, so as to insure the safety of the public.
The liability for negligence and misfeasance of third parties,
does not always depend on the'-relation of master and servant.
A party for whose benefit work has been negligently done," is
answerable for the consequences. Bush vs. Steinman, 1 Bos. &
Pul. 403; Randelson vs. Murray, 8 Adol. & Ellis 109; Stone vs.
Cartwright,6 Term R. 411; Mayor, &ac.,of the City of New York
vs. Bailey, 2 Denio 433.
. Vf. F'. White, for defendant in error.--There are but three
grounds on which the liability of the city, in this case, can be
placed:1. The doctrine of respondeatsuperlor.
2. The doctrine of Bush vs. Steinman, as to the liability of
the owner of fixed real estate; or,
3. That it-was. the duty of the city, to put up and maintain
barriers at the excavation, while the sewer was being constructed.
If the sewer'had been built by the officers of the city, or by
workmen employed by them, she would have been liable on the
doctrine of respondeat superior; but being built by a contractor,
who took the whole job at a contract price, employing and paying
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his own workmen, over whom the city had no control whatever,
she is not liable on that doctrine, for the rule does not apply in
such cases. If the building of the sewer was a municipal duty,
enjoined by statute, she could not evade responsibility, by giving
it out to a contractor. But being merely a power vested in the
city authorities, not so much for general municipal purposes, as
for the benefit of a portion of the citizens, and the city authorities
being clothed with that power chiefly because it was the most convenient way of exercising it, the city, for this purpose, stood on
the footing of an individual or private corporation, possessed of
the same right to put the job out on contract, and held only to the
same responsibility.
There is a good deal of confusion in the reported cases; and
there are some dicta to the effect that individuals and corporations are liable for the negligence of their contractors. But, on a
careful examination, it will be found, that all the cases come
within the rule of respondeat superior, or rest upon some other
principle than that laid down in Bushvs. Steinman; Sty vs. Edgkl,

6 Esp. 6, Mathews vs. West London Water ,Works Company, 3
Camp. 403, which followed Bush vs. Steifiman, were nisi prius
cases. In Laugher vs. Painter,5 B. & 0. 547, and in Quarman
vs. Burnett, 6 M.. & W. 499, it was doubted; and in Reedie vs.
N. W. R. R. Co., 4 Exch. 248, Bush vs. Steinman was expressly
overruled. See also Peachey vs. Rowland, 16 E. L. & E.- Rep.
442; Overton vs. Freeman, 8 E. L. & E. 479; Sadler vs. Benlock, 30 E. L. & E. 167; Steel vs. S, . B. B. Co., 32,E. L. & E.
366; Scott vs. Mayor, &c., 38 E. L. & E. 477. In the United
States see Bailey vs. Mayor, &c., 3 Hill"521, 2 Denio 433;

Delmonico vs. Mayor, f.t, 1 Sandf. 222; Lloyd vs. Mayor, &c.,
1 Selden 369 ; Blake vs. Ferris,1 Seld. 48 ; Pack vs. Mayor, &c.,
4 Seld. 222 ; Kelly vs. Mayor, &c., 1 Kernan 432 ; Curriervs.
Lowell, 16 Pick. 170; Lowell vs. B. & L. R. B. Co., 23 Pick.
24; Hilliard vs. Richardson, 3 Gray 349; Carson vs. Godley,
2 Casey 111 ; Brie vs. Schwingle, 10 Harris 384; West Chester
vs. Apple, 11 Casey 284; Samyn vs. MeCloskey, 2 Ohio 536;
Carman vs. S. & T. B. R. Co., 4 Ohio 399; .De Forrest vs.
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Wright, 2 Mich. 368; Barry vs. &. LouiR, 17 M%. 121; Wiswall
vs. Brinson, 10 Ired. 554; Buffalo vs. Halloway, 3 Seld. 493.
The foregoing review of English and American decisions
establishes the following propositions :1. That the contractors or their workmen were not the agents
or servants of the city within the meaning of the rule respondeat
superior, so as to render the city liable for their negligence.
2. That the doctrine in Bush vs. Steinman was never the
recognised law in England or America; that it has been expressly overruled in England, and that it has been expressly
repudiated in New York and Massachusetts.
3. That no' case in the English reports, and but one in the
American (City of Buffalo vs. Halloway) has been found as a precedent for holding the city of Pittsburgh liable in this case.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
STRONG, J.-The case was put to the jury to find whether the
injury which resulted in the death of the plaintiff's husband was
or was not occasioned by the negligence of the defendant's contractors, or that of the contractor's agents or servants, and the
verdict establishes that it was. To this mode of submitting thb
case no exception was taken, and nothing is, therefore, presented
to us but the.questions reserved. Of these it is necessary to consider only one, which is whether a corporation is respohsible for an
injury occasioned by the negligence of contractors with it, or of
their agents and servants.
By an Act of Assembly of April 22, 1858, the Select and Common Councils of the 'city of Pittsburgh were authorized, whenever
they should deem it necessary, to cause sewers to be constructed
in any street of the city, and for the payment of the cost levy an
assessment upon the property benefited. In pursuance of the
act, an ordinance was passed on the 25th of October 1858, providing for the construction of a sewer in St. Clair street, and on
the 1st of June 1859, a written contract for its construction was
entered into with Allen & Kerr, contractors, by which they
covenanted to build or construct a brick sewer, with all necessary
inlets, and to furnish all the material therefor, for stipulated prices
VOL. XII.-23
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for the excavation, replacing over the sewer, removing surplus
material, repaving, for brick and stone work, and for iron, and
they agreed that the material, workmanship, and excavation
should be satisfactory to the recording regulator. They began
the work soon after, excavated the earth to the depth of twenty
feet in some places, directed barriers to be placed across the ends
and along the sides of the trench, and employed a man to take
care that the barriers should be at all times kept up. Notwithstanding this, however, the husband of the plaintiff fell into the
excavation, on the night of the twenty-eighth of June 1859, and
received hurts which caused his death. The verdict of the jury
determines that the injury was not a consequence in whole or in part
of his negligence; but was caused entirely by the negligence of
the contractors, or of their agents or servants. Is the city liable ?
We think not. The wrong was not done by any servants of' the
defendants. There is no room for the application of the principle
respondeat superior. The defendants had no control over the men
employed by the contractors, or over the contractors themselves.
They could not dismiss them, or direct their work. The excavation was not illegal, and there was a superior to the workmen, to
wit: the contractors. There cannot be more than one superior;
legally responsible. Undoubtedly there has been much confusion,
and some conflict of decision on the subject, growing out of the
early case of Bush vs. Steinman, 1 Bos. & Pal. 404 ; but that case
long since ceased to be regarded as a correct enunciation of the
law in England, and both its reasoning and authority are denied.
It is now settled in that country that defendants, not personally.
interfering or giving directions respecting the progress of a work,
but contracting with a third person to do it, are not responsible
for a wrongful act done, or negligence in the performance of the
contract, if the act agreed to be done is legal.
Such is the doctrine of Rapson vs. Cubitt, 9 Mees. & W. 710;
Reedie vs. The London and Northeastern Railroad Company, 4
Exch. 248; Overton vs. Freeman, 6 Eng- L. & E. 479; Peacecy
vs. Rowland, 16 Eng. L. & E. 442, and numerous other English
vases. In Gray and wife vs. Hubble and Pullen, decided in the
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Queen's Bench, April 16, 1863, (Law Journal Reports, vol. 32,
part 8, N. S.), Chief Justice COCKBURN asserts it to be better common doctrifie, that "if a person in the exercise of his rights as a
private individual, or of those conferred upon him by statute,
employs a contractor to do work, and the latter is guilty of negligcnce in doing it, the contractor, and not the employer, is liable."
Similar opinions were expressed by all the judges.
Such, also, we understand to be the doctrine in this country, sustained by a decided preponderance of authorities. It would answer
no good purpose to review the cases at length. The English ones,
and many of the American, are reviewed and commented upon in
Billiard vs. Richardson, 3 Gray 359; in Barry vs. The City of
St. Louis, 17 Missouri 121; and Blake vs. Ferris, 1 Selden 48.
The general principle to be extracted from them is that a person,
either natural or artificial, is not liable for the acts or negligence
of another, unless the relation of master and servant or principal
and agent, exist between them; that when an injury is done by a
party exercising an independent employment, the party employing
him is not responsible to the person injured. And the rule applies
with full force to municipal corporations. In Blake vs. Ferrisif
was held by the New York Court of Appeals that the defendants,
who had a license from the city to construct, at their own expense,
a sewer in a public street, and who had engaged another person
by contract to construct the whole work at a stipulated price, were
not liable to third persons for any injury resulting from the negligent manner in which the sewer had been left over night by the
workmen engaged in its construction. It was declared that the
immediate employer of the agent or servant, through whose negligence an injury occurs, is alone responsible for the negligence of
such agent or servant; that the principle of respondeat superior
applies to him alone; and that there cannot be two superiors
severally responsible in such a case. Blake vs. Ferriswas followed by Pack vs. The Mayor, &c., of New York, 4 Selden 222;
in which the same court held the City Corporation not liable to
third persons for injuries caused by negligence of workmen
employed in grading a street under the direction of a person who
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had entered into a contract with the corporation to do the work for
a specified sum. The liability was declared to be upon the contractor alone, and the court denied that he was the servant or
agent of the corporation. It was further ruled that a clause in the
contract, by which the contractor engaged to conform the work to
such further directions as .might be given by the Street Commissioner did not affect the case, that it only gave the corporation
power to direct as to the results of the work, without "any control
over the manner of performing it, 'which dontrol alone furnishes
a ground for holding the master or principal liable for the act of
a servant or agent. Kelly vs. The Mayor, &c., of New York, 1
Kernan 482, is another case in which the tame rule was applied.
.Barryvs. The City of St. Louis, 17 Missouri 121, is another wellconsidered case affirming fully the doctrine. The corporation had
contracted with one Brooks for the construction of a street sewer.
The contractor was, for an -agreed sum, to furnish all the materials
and do all the work, including excavation. The contract reserved
a right for the city engineer to inspect the work as it progressed,
and watch 'its execution. During its progress a deep trench was
dug, into which the plaintiff fell at night and was injdred, in consequence of a failure to erect barriers and set up lights. The case
was very like the. present. Yet it was held the corpovation was
not liable, *and the general principle was laid down, after quite a
full review of the English and American authorities, that muniCipal corporations are not liable for damages occasioned ty the
negligence of contractors.
.It is conceded there are a few cases that intimate, if they do not
declare, a different doctrine, but they are not the more modern
.and best considered, During the argument much reliance was
placed by the plaintiffs in error upon City of 'Chicago vs. Robbins,
11 American Law Register 529, which was a suit by the city to
recover from Robbins-what the corporation had been compelled to
pay to a person injured by falling into an excavation in one of the
sidewalks. The defendant was the owner pf a lot, and he had contracted with one Button for the erection of a -house thereon, including an excavation 'of the sidewalk adjoining, foi the purpoges

PAINTER vs. CITY OF PITTSBURGH.

of light and air for the basement. By the contract, he had a right
to supervise the work; a right which he exercised. He knew of
the dangerous condition in which the excavation was left; his
attention was frequently called to it, and he promised to attend to
it. Nothing, however, was done, and he was held liable apparently for his own negligence. It is true some expressions of the
court appear to recognise a distinction between the liabilities of
owners of real estate or fixed property, as it is called, for injuries
resulting from nuisances on such property, no matter by whom
erected or maintained, and liabilities of owners of other property
for the negligence of their contractors. This distinction, however,
has been exploded in England, where it originated, and it can be
supported by no sound reasons. Milligan vs, Wedge, 12 A. & E.
737 ; Allen vs. Hayward, 7 A. &E. New Series, 900; .Reedie vs.
R. R?. Co., 4 Exch. 244.
,It is difficult to discover any substantial reason of good policy
for holding the present defendants responsible to the plaintiff.
The negligence complained of was not theirs. It does not appear
that they knew of it. The verdict' determines that the fault was
all that of the contractors. Over them the defendants had no
more control than the plaintiff's husband had. They were not in
a subordinate relation to the defendants-neither servants nor
agents. They were in an independent employment, and sound
policy demands that, in such a case, the contractor alone should
be held liable. In making* a sewer, he has necessarily the temporary occupancy of the street in which the work is done, and it
must be exclusive. His servants and agents are upon the ground,
and he can more conveniently and certainly protect the publie
against injury from the work than can the officers of the municipal
corporation. The public will be better protected if it be held
that the contractor alone is responsible for his negligence, and
that the city does not stand between him and any person injured.
.Thus he will be taught caution, 'hile a sufferer by the negligence
of his servants will not be compelled to resort for compensation tc
the insolvent servants.
By reason and authority, then, we are led to the conclusion te
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.which the District Court came, that the defendants are not liable
for the negligence of Allen & Kerr, their contractors.
The judgment is affirmed.
The liability of one person for the
acts of another, rests generally upon the
maxim, Qui facit per atium facit per se;
and in order, therefore, to establish such
liability, it should appear that the act
producing the injury, though done by
another, is really the act of the person
charged. This can only be, in general,
from the relation of the parties to each
other as master and servant, or as principal and agent; in the first case, because the servant is presumed to be
under the personal direction and control of the master, and in the second,
because the principal has voluntarily
substituted pro hac vice the agent for
himself, and assumed the agent's acts
as his own.
I. The application of these principles
frequently givei rise to questions of
very great nicety, one of the most important of which, as to the responsibility for the acts or negligence of a
contractor, is discussed in the principal
case.
1. The starting-point from which all
the modern cases on this question have
been argued, is the case of Bush vs.
Steinman, 1 Bos. & Pull. 404 (1799).
In that case, the owner of a house had
contracted with a surveyor to put it in
repair for a certain sum; the surveyor
made a sub-contract for the work, and
a servant of one of the sub-contractors
left a heap of lime on the road in front
of the house, by which the plaintiff's
carriage was upset, and the plaintiff
injured. Itwas held that the owner of
the house was liable, though the grounds
of the judgment are not clearly set
forth, and indeed, EYnE, C. J., says he
has "great difficulty in stating with

accuracy the ground on which the action is to be supported," and RooKE, J.,
says, "he who has work going on for
his benefit, and on his own premises,
must be civilly answerable for the acts
of those whom he employs." This case
was followed in Sly vs. Edgley, 6 Esp.
6, and Mathews vs. West London Waterworks Co., 3 Camp. 403. In Laugher
vs. Pointer, 6 B. & C. 547, however, the
question arose as to the liability of the
owner of a carriage, who had hired
horses and a driver from a livery stable,
for negligence of the driver by which a
third person was injured. The judges
were equally divided: BAYLEY and HoLBoYD, JJ., holding that he was liable,
and ABBOTT, C. J., and LITTLEDALE, T.,

that he was not. The question therefore, still unsettled, came up again in
Quarman vs. Burnett, 6 M. & W. 499
(1840), a case almost identical with
Laugher vs. Pointer, and the court held
that the defendant was not liable, thus
affirming the opinion of ABBOTT and
LITTLEDALE.

Quarman vs. Burnett seems to have
been accepted as settling the point, and
has been uniformly followed: Rapson
vs. Cubitt, 9 M. & W. 710: Milligan vs.
Wedge, 12 Ad. & E. 787 (40 B. C. L.
Rep. 177); Allen vs. Hayward, 7 Ad.
& E. 960; Reedie vs. London N. W. R.'
R. Co., 4 Exch. 243 ; Overton vs. Freeman, 8 Eng. L. & E. 479; Peachy vs.
Rowland, 16 Eng. L. & E. 442; Sadler
vs. Henlock, 30 Eng. L. & E. 167 ; Steel
vs. S. E. R. R. Co., 32 Eng. L. & E.
866; Knight vs. Fox, 1 E. L. & E. 477;
and Scott vs. Mayor, &o., 88 Eng. L. &
E. 477. So that it appears now settled
that where a person employs another,
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exercising a distinct employment, to do
a piece of work by a special contract for
a stipulated sum, and does not interfere
with the modi of performance, he is not
r~sponsible for the acts or negligence of
the contractor.
2. In the United States the decisions
on this point have not been uniform.
In New York the cases have been
numerous, and fora time seemed inclined
to follow the lead of Bush vs. Steinman;
Bailey vs. Mayor of New York, 8 Hill
581 and 2 Denio 433; Mayor, &c., vs.
Furze, 3 Hill 612; Delmonico vs. Mayor,
&c., I Sandf. 222; Lloyd vs. Mayor, &c.,
1 Seld. 369. But in Blake vs. Ferris, 1
Seld. 48 (1851), the Court of Appeals,
after an elaborate examination of the
English and American authoritieS, drew
distinctions between the cases already
cited and the true question of responsibility for negligence of a contractor,
and declared that the principle laid down
in Bush vs. Steinman was not law in that
state. This has since been affirmed and
followed in Pack vs. Mayor, &c., 4 Seld.
222; Kelly vs. Mayor, &c., 1 Kern. 482;
O'Rourke vs. Hart, 7 Bosworth 511.
In Pennsylvania the point has not
been formally decided until the 'present
ease.
In Massachusetts the earlier decisions
also followed Bush vs. Steinman; Stone
vs Codman, 15 Pick. 297; Currier vs.
Lowell, 16 Pick. 170; Lowell vs. B. &
L. R. R. Co., 23 Pick. 24; and in the
,ast case, WILDE, J., says that *Bush vs.
Steinman "is fully supported by the authorities cited, and by well-established
principles." But in Hilliard vs. Richardson, 3 Gray 849.(1855), THOMAs, J.,
after the most exhaustive examination
of the point to be found in any case,
comes to the conclusion that Bush vs.
Steinman has been overruled "directly
aId indirectly by reasoning and by authority," and this appears to be settled
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law in that state; Linton vi.Si7ith etal
8 Gray 147 ; Brackett vs. Lubke; 4 Allen
188. In Missouri, Barry vs. St. Louis.
17 Mo. 121; in Michigan, De Forrest vs.
Wright, 2 Mich. 868; and in Ohio, Carman vs. S. & T. R. R. Co., 4 Ohio State
Rep. 899, the same doctrine has been
held, and this may now be considered
to have by far the greatest weight of
authority.
8. In North Carolina, however, in
1849, Wiswall vs. Brinson, 10 Ired. 554,
the defendant was held liable not only
on the authority of Bush vs. Steinman.
but also on principle as expressed in the
maxims, sic utere tuo, &c., and gui facif
per alium, &c., from which PRARSON, J.,
deduces a general rule, undoubtedly too
broad to be tenable, that "when one
procures work to be done, and a third
person is injured by the negligence or
want of skill of persons employed, the
person for whose benefit and at whose
instance the work is done must make
compensation."
In Illinois a railroad company was
held liable for the acts of its contractors
in taking timber, &c., which the company was authorized by its charter to
take ; CA.TOx, J., saying "the contractors were none the less the servants of
the company because they were doing
the work by contract, and for a stipulated price. The work was still done
by the company and under the authority of their charter." Lesher et aL. vs.
Wabash Nay. Co., 14 Ill. 85; a-id this
was subsequently affirmed in Hinda' vs.
Wabash Nay. Co., 15 111. 72 ; and Chicago, &c., R. R. Co. vs. McCarthy, 20
Ill. 385. But these cases appear to us
to have been overruled by Scammon el
424; for althougl:
aL. vs. Chicago, 25 Ill.
in the latter case WALKER, J., endea
vors to draw a distinction between
them, and says, "in those cases the law
authorized the company to appropriate
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the timber to their use, and it was held
that they had delegated the authority to
the contractors ;" yet in the first two
cases the contractors were bound by
their contract to furnish material attheir
ewn expense, which expressly negatives
the idea that the company had delegated
their authority to take timber.
II. In Bush vs. Steinman it was intimated that a distinction existed between
real estate and personalty in regard to
the liability of the owner, and in
Laugher vs. Pointer, LITTLEDALE, J.,
drew the distinction explicitly, and it

own acts. A contract may render the
contractor liable over to the city, but
the city must still remain responsible
primarily to the person injured by neglect of what is properly a portion of its
municipal duties.
The cases in which this responsii,ility
has been conceded without question are
far too numerous for citation, but in
some cases it has been expressly decided.
In Willard vs. Town of Newbury, 22
'Vt. 458, the town was held liable for not
keeping a highway in safe condition,
though a railroad company had authorwas also approved by ABnoTT, C. J. ity, and was constructing a crossing over
This point was afterwards approved in the road, and in Batty vs. Duxbury, 24
Quarman v.. Burnett, and also in Rap.
son vs. Cubitt, decided in 1842, although
Lord DENMAN, in Milligan- vs. Wedge,
two years before, had expressed his
doubt of its soundness. But in Reedie
vs. London N. W. R. R. Co, 4 Exch.
243, it was said by ROLr, B. (since
Lord Chancellor CRANwOnTH), that in
these cases it had not been necessary to
decide this point and, that, "on full consideration, we have come to the conclusion that there is no such distinction,
unless perhaps in cases where the act
complained of is such as to amount to a
nuisance," and this is now the settled
law in England as well as in most of the
United States.
I1. So far, therefore, as the principal case is to be regarded as an enunciation of the limits of the doctrine of respondeal superior, it undoubtedly follows
the strong current of modern authorities.
Bat there is another ground which was
apparently not urged in the argument,
and is not noticed by the court, on which
the correctness of the decision appears
to us very questionable. It is undoubtedly the duty of a municipal corporation
to. keep its streets in a safe condition for
public travel, and it is not shown upon
what principle of law the city can h
allowed to shift this obligation by its

Vt. 165, it is said by RE.DnELD, J., to be

"settled law in this state that the primary obligation rests upon the towns
where railroads obstruct theirbighways,
to see that the public have a proper byway to pass around the obstruction, and
that proper obstructions be placed and
kept up, to divert the travel from such
highway, so long as it remains in an
unfit state for the public use, so far as
this could be done by common care and
diligence; and that it is not competent
for the town to fold their hands and
shift this responsibility upon others,
whether natural or artificial persons."
So in City of Buffalo vs. Holloway, 8
Selden 493, the city had contracted with
H3tloway to construct a sewer, and
while he was building it one Tripp fell
into the excavation and received severe
injury, for which he brought suit and
recovered damages against the city.
This was a suit by the city against the
contractor to recover back the amount
of damages, and the court, making a
very strict construction of the contract,
held that the duty of keeping guards
and lights there, if such were necessary,
was upon'the city, and not on the contractor, unless he was spreially bound
by his contract to put them up. But
whether or not the narrow construction
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of the contract in this case was correct, is
not material as regards the rights of the
person injured; the duty, by neglect of
which he is damaged, is primarily upon
the city, and he is not bound by any principle of law to look beyond that. And in
Storr vs. City of Utica, 17 N. Y. 104, the
Court of Appeals of New York held that
the person causing a ditch to be dug
cannot " escape responsibility for putting a public street in a condition dangerous for travel, by interposing the
contract which he himself has made for
the very thingwhich creates the danger."
An agreement that the contractor shall
put up guards, &c., may make him
liable to the principal, but it cannot
shield the ultimate superior or author of
the work from responsibility. And the
court further say, "the principles suggested become plain propositions in the
case of a municipal corporation, which
owes to the public the duty of keeping
its streets in a safe condition for traveL"
In City of Chicago vs. Robbins, 2 Am.
Law Reg. N. S. 529, the Supreme Court
of U. S. appears to have followed the
same principles, though there is evidence

in the reported facts that the defendant
had superintended thework himself, and
it is said by the court in the principal
case that Robbins "was held liable apparently for his own negligence." But the
primary liability of the city is assumed
throughout in Chicago vs. Robbins, and
is not questioned in the comments by
the court in the case under discussion.
The principal case appears to be sup.ported by the decision in West Chester
vs. Apple, 11 Casey 284, where it was
held that a municipal corporation was
not liable for damages resulting from the
improper filling of a trench dug by a
private person under a license from the
corporation, to introduce water into his
house om the main conduit-pipe. But
that decision does not appear to have
been carefully considered, and is not
fortified by the citation of any authorities. Notwithstanding this support,
therefore, we cannot regard the case
under discussion, in its application to
municipal corporations as either satisfactory on principle or established on
authority.
J. T. M.

In the Court of ChancerTy of Loui8ville, Kentucky.
JOHN R. ALLEN V8. ISAAC RUSSELL ET AL.
A public war suspends all existing contracts between citizens of the hostile states.
and prohibits all commercial and other intercourse.
A rebellion which has been recognised by the government as amounting to a civis
war, draws after it all the consequences of a public war.
But the government assailed may avail itself of the full rights and privileges of
the laws of war, or it may confine itself to so much only as its interest or policy
may dictate.
The Act of Congress of 18th July 1861, and the President's Proclamation of MbOh
I
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August 1861, recognised an insurrection "ainounting to civil war, as existing in
the state of Tennessee. but did not put in force against the people of that state
all the rights and privileges conferred on the National Government by the laws
of war.
The expression "commercial intercourse" in the Act of 13th July 1861, is to be
considered as limited by the specifications in the act, and therefore must be
taken to mean trading, trafficking, negotiating, conveying goods and chattels, &a.
Therefore, where a partnership of three persons existed in Kentucky, and two of
them, being disloyal, became residents in a rebellious state, and there, after the
Act of Congress of 1861 and the President's Proclamation, made a deed of assignment of the partnership property to a creditor in Kentucky, for the purpose
of -securing his and other debts due by them to persons in a loyal state, the
making of such deed was not such "commercial intercourse" as is within the
prohibition of the Act of Congress and the President's Proclamation.
Nor is it material that the creditor went into the rebellious state for the purpose
of procuring such deed, and brought it to Kentucky. The deed was not an
article of commerce within the Act of Congress and the President's Proclamation.
By the laws of war, the partnership was dissolved, but the third and loyal partner
was not-a surviving partner. The others were not. civilly dead, and no conviction of treason having ensued, their right of property still remained and passed
under their deed.

G. A.

.

J. Caldwel, for plaintiff.

,Speed - Smith; for defendants.
The facts of the case appear in the opinion of the court, which
was delivered March 4th 1864, by
PIRTLE, Chanaellor.-The complainant exhibited this petition
stating that a manufacturing firm composed of C. Q. Armstrong,
Warren Mitchell, and Isaac Russell, had been doing business in
the city of Louisville, and that on the 29th November 1861, said
Armstrong and said Mitchell conveyed to plaintiff by deed of
assignment, the land on which their manufactory was situated,
and the stock, &c., and manufactured articles on hand, &c., in
trust for the payment of the debts of the firm, &c. ; that said
Russell refused to execute the deed, and. so his interest did not
pass by it. And the petition asks for the settling up of the affairs
of the firm, and the payment of the debts, &c.
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The answer of Russell alleges that Armstrong and Mitchell had
become inhabitants of the state of Tennessee before and at the time
of the making of said deed, which state was in open rebellion
against the United States, and was one of the states included in
the President's Proclamation of the 16th of August 1861, made
in pursuance of the Act of Congress of the 13th July 1861, and
that said Armstrong and Mitchell were in said state when the
deed was executed, assisting in the rebellion and giving aid and
comfort to the rebels against the United States; that said Mitchell is still in the so-called Confederate States, and that said
Armstrong died there. It also states that the plaintiff made his
way through the military lines of our army without the permit of
any civil or military authority of the United States, for the purpose of procuring said deed, and accepting the trust pretended to
be made. And it insists that the firm was dissolved by the disloyal and rebellious conduct of the grantors in the deed.
To this answer the plaintiff demurs.
The deed is made part of the record, and it shows that one of
the objects of the deed was to secure the said John R. Allen in
the sum of about $3000.
That a state of war existed at this time between the United
States and the states mentioned in the President's Proclamation
of the 16th August 1861, cannot be denied, but is affirmed by the
Supreme Court of the United States in the case of the Hiawatha,
9th March 1863, Lawrence's Wheaton Supplement, page 13 et 8eq.
By the general law of war, Sir WILLIAM SCOTT (Lord STOWELL) said
in the case of The Cosmopolite, 4 Rob. 8, it was perfectly well known
that "call communication" between the subjects of belligerent
countries must be suspended, and that "cno intercourse" can
legally be carried on between the subjects of hostile states, but by
special license of their respective governments. And in the case
of The Neptunus, 6 Rob. 403, he observed that a declaration of
hostilities naturally carries with it an interdiction of all commercial intercourse. It was the natural result of a state of war,
and it was not necessary that there should be a special interdiction of commerce to produce that effect. And in the case of The
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Goode Hoop, 1 Edw. Adm. Rep. 828, he declared that " a state of
.war was a state of interdiction of communication."
There can be nothing better settled amongst mankind than these
things. And a state of public war does not only cut off commercial but other- intercourse between the people of the respective
belligerents. See the opinion of Chancellor KENT in the case of
Griswold vs. Waddington, 16 Johns. Rep. 488; perhaps the
fullest and most learned judgment ever pronounced on these subjects. But the sovereign power is at liberty, of course, to avail
itself of the full reach of the laws of war, or to include only so
much as its own interest or policy may dictate.
Mr. Justice NELSON, in delivering the opinion of the minority
of the Supreme Court in the case of the Hiawatha, said :-" The
legal consequences resulting from a state of war between two
countries, at this day, are well understood, and will be found
described in every approved work on the subject of international law.
The people of the two countries immediately become the enemies of
each other, all intercourse, commercial or otherwise, between them,
unlawful-all contracts existing at the commencement of the war,
suspended, and all made during its existence, utterly void-the
insurances of enemy's property, the drawing of bills of exchange,
or purchase in the enemy's country; the remission of bills or
money to it, are illegal and void. Existing partnerships between
the citizens or subjects of the two countries are dissolved, and, in
fine, interdiction of trade and intercourse, direct or indirect, is
absolute and complete by the mere force and effect of war itself."
And in the next paragraph he says :-" In the case of rebellion,
or resistance by a portion of the people of a7 country against the
established government, there is no doubt, if, in its progress and
enlargement, ths government thus sought to be overthrown, see fit,
it may by the competent power recognise or declare the existence
of a state of civil war, which will draw after it all the consequences
and rights of war between the contending parties, as in the case of
public war." The doctrines here laid down were evidently concurred in by the whole court, for this concurrence is the plain
result of the argument of the majority in the opinion d6livered by
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Mr. Justice GRIER. The difference in the court was on the time
of the commencement of the state of war; the majority fixing
it with the President's Proclamation of the 19th and 27th April;
the minority on the date of the proclamation especially authorized
by Congress by the Act of the 13th July 1861.
This case, if there be nothing to qualify the fact of a state of
war when the deed was made, comes literally within the doctrines
laid down by KENT, Lord STOWELL, the authorities generally on international law, and the Supreme Court of the United States.
The Court of Appeals of Kentucky, in the case of Norri8 vs.
Doniphcan, 9th July 1863, decide that a public war exists under
the rebellion so far that a citizen of Arkansas cannot have a
atanding in court in this state. By the law of nations, when
the right to sue in courts is cut off by war, that state of war
is such as inhibits commercial intercourse ; as the- absolute and
necessary result they go together : Bynkershoek, Book 1st,
Chapter 7; Wheaton 546, 547; The Hoop, 1 Rob.- Rep. 196;
Grisold vs. Waddington, 16 Johns. Rep. 469.
The law of war may be stated, perhaps, a little stronger.
Where goods had been bought by Englishmen before a war with
Spain and a war with France, and were attempted, -after the war
commenced, to be brought home, and were captured by an English
ship, they were declared lawful prizes; because if merchants were
permitted, in time of war, to import goods from *the enemy's
country under the pretence that they were the property of the
English, were purchased before the war, and deposited in their
warehouses in the foreign country until they could be sent for and
brought home, it would be a cover for a continued trade, ane
operate to an alarming degree: 16 Johns. 460, cited in the last
mentioned case. In the case of The Rapid, before the SupremL
Court of the United States, 8 Cranch 155, an American citizen ha(;
purchased a quantity of English goods in England before the war
of 1812, and deposited them on a little island called Indian Island,
belonging to Great Britain, near what was then the Province of
Maine. On the breaking out of the war, he-sent the Rapid from
Boston to the island to bring away the goods, and she was captured
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on her return by an American privateer, and was condemned as
lawful prize, because she was trading at an enemy's island, and
the goods had acquired the character of enemy's property. The
court, in delivering the opinion, said that the law of prize was part
of the law of nations, and that by trading, in the prize law, was
meant, not merely that signification of the term which consists in
negotiation or contract, but the object and spirit of the rule were
to cut off all communication or actual locomotive intercourse
between individuals of the belligerents; that intercour8einconsistent
with actual hostility was the offence against which the operation of
the rule was directed. See also Wheaton 547, 548, 549, and the
case of The Lawrence, 1 Gallison's Reports 470.
But did these strict rules, in their spirit, apply to this country
at the time of the making of this deed? or is there anything to
qualify the fact of a state of war?
The traitorous machinations of a comparatively few reckless,
ambitious and disappointed politicians had, in a few months,
thrown millions of our fellow-citizens into a rebellion, the most
stupendous ever beheld in civilization. Yes, millions, by the
artifice of bad men, had been cheated into -a condition of separation from the Union, without any agency of their own whatever.
Our Government claimed all, good and bad, as citizens bound to
obey the Constitution of the United States; and the President's
first proclamation enjoined this obedience, and called them back
to the common allegiance. We did not treat them as foreign
public enemies, except so far as we were forced to do in defence
of the Union and the Constitution. The Government made exceptions of good men, and of parts of the states-in rebellion, and all
loyal 6itizens, out of the territory of the rebellion, felt a strong
sympathy for those who were held against their will to submit to
the new tyranny, binding them to the detested revolt. Our
Government did not as to them, as the French king did in 1756,
with regari to the English, enjoining all his subjects, vassals, and
servants to fall upon the subjects of the. king of England, and
forbear " all communication, commerce, and intelligence with them
on pain of death." Perhaps, consistent with the laws of war, all
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communication might have been forbidden by our Governiment;
but it was not so ordered. Commerce was forbidden, by the Act
of the 13th July, to be carried into effect by the President's
Proclamation which was made 16th August.
The Act of Congress (5th Section), after stating the grounds
that shall justify the proclamation of the President, says:" Then and in such case, it may and shall be lawful for the President, by proclamation, to declare that the inhabitants of such
state, or any section or part thereof, where such insurrection
exists, are in a state of insurrection against the United States :
and thereupon all commercial intercourse by and between the
same and the citizens thereof, and the citizens of the rest of the
United States, shall cease and be unlawful, so long as such condition of hostility shall continue; and all goods and chattels, wares
and merchandise coming from said state or section into the other
parts of the United States, and all proceeding to such state or
section, by land or water, shall, together with the vessel or vehicle
conveying the same, or conveying persons to or from said state or
section, be forfeited to the United States." .
The expression "commercial intercourse" in this Act evidently means trading, trafficking, negotiating, contracting, con.
veying goods and chattels, &c., and this appears by the last clause
quoted ; for its office is to show to what the inhibition extended.
Something else might come* within the expression "commercial
intercourse," but I think, in the Act of Congress, the specifications give the extent of its operation, and include everything meant
to be affected. The inhibition is not as to persons directly, but as
to the vessels or vehicles conveying persons to or from such state
or section, and declares they shall 'be forfeited. And this shows
that the whole provision had a reference to trading, &c., of some
kind ; -and, in fact, the inhibition of persons has been left to the
sound discretion of the military commanders, and has not practically been held to be within this Act or the proclamation of the
President.
The making of this deed in Tennessee by persons, though dis.
loyal, for the purpose of providing for the payment of their debts
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to loyal people in Kentucky and Massachusetts, out of prbperty
and effects in Kentucky, is not, it seems to me, such commercial
intercourse as comes within the meaning of the Act of Congress,
nor is it prohibited by any just application we can make, under
our circumstances, of the general laws of war. The prohibition by
Congress shows how far it was intended, in our unhappy struggle,
to apply these general rules of war, as to intercourse with an
enemy.
In the Circuit Court of the United States for the Kentucky District, in the case of The United States vs. The vendee of Thomas
J. Clay, who went into the army of the so-called Confederate
States, as an officer, and when in Louisville on parol as a prisoner
of war, taken by our army at Fort Donelson, made a deed to his
brother-in-law, dated 10th June 1862, for money due before he
joined the army of the insurgents, it was decided 2d December
1863, that the deed was good, and passed the title to real estate
mentioned therein.
Such 'deeds as this, we may properly infer, were not deemed
void by anything that preceded, for the Congress thought it necessary to declafe by the 5th and 6th sections of the Act of 17th July
1862, that all sales, transfers, and conveyances made thereafter by
such persons should be void. Had such a conveyance been void in
1861, there would have been no occasion for this provision in
1862. I think this shows the view held by the legislative department of the Government.
If an enemy within the rebel lines should order his agent in
this state to pay a debt, contracted lawfully before the war, with
property or money, I am not aware of anything wrong in this
according to the public law, of war. Goods might be seized when
passing, but the appropriation of property or money already here,
to the payment of debts to our people, is not only honest, but takes
so much of the funds of rebels to- another use, and weakens them
so much. We must not pay to them, but wve may receive their
funds to pay debts owed us, where there is no negotiation, as in
bills of exchange, &c., which might do them any good.
In this case there was nothing like the going for one's own goods

